My dissertation book project examines how China is influencing rules and norms governing the global commons. Specifically, I compare Chinese behavior across three domains: the deep sea (deep seabed mining), outer space, and cyberspace. I argue that China’s approach to each is a function of two factors: the domain’s security salience to the Party-state and the comprehensiveness of pre-existing institutions governing each domain. Drawing from primary source Chinese materials as well as several original datasets documenting proposals at various international institutions, I take a multi-method approach to analyze each case.

Governance of the global commons traditionally focuses on managing common pool resource problems. However, frontier domains like the moon and the deep sea, while legally recognized as the common heritage of humanity, fundamentally differ from issues like fishery management in that most states lack the capacity to access them. In this paper, I argue that these frontier domains therefore constitute “technology-gated commons.” Using datasets of proposed edits to the International Seabed Authority’s draft mining code and speeches made at the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, I show that states which lack the technological capacity to access these domains consistently attempt to impose limits on states that can access these domains through formal rule-making processes.

What is China’s vision for international order? How does this vision compare to liberal international order(s)? This paper analyzes the vision of order outlined by three recent PRC government initiatives: the Global Development Initiative, the Global Security Initiative, and the Global Civilization Initiative. Based on these initiatives, China primarily appears to be targeting important norms in the security, political, and social development orders for change. However, in other issue areas, notably the environment, the PRC seems much more supportive of prevailing rules and norms. Moreover, some Chinese efforts appear more focused on eroding U.S. hegemony than overturning the “liberal international order.” Altogether, these initiatives suggest that Beijing is attempting to change certain targeted aspects of international order and return them to a less normatively hegemonic, Westphalian logic.